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This essay analyses those statements that mention legal norms in negative terms. Specifically, it analyses those
statements that define a legal system by mentioning how legal protection does not work and where legal protec-
tion ends, and those statements that identify what rights‐holders do not have to with their legally protected free
capacities. This essay argues that these statements address a systemic question. It calls such a dynamic as nega-
tive governmentality. The argument proceeds in four steps. It introduces the concept of negative governmentality
by arguing that the idea of freedom requires both the positive affirmation of moral agency and the constraining of
moral agency (Section 2). It then explores how rights constitute freedom by limiting rights or making exceptions to
them (Section 3). Later, it analyses how rights‐based norms prevent abuse of rights by holders of rights (Section 4).
Finally, it sees how rights‐based norms constrain the legal guarantor of rights, i.e., a state (Section 5). The essay
concludes by mentioning the importance of negative governmentality (Section 6).*PhD Ca
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Eur LawThe nature of an use is best discerned by considering first, what it is not; and then what it is: for it is the
nature of all human science and knowledge to proceed most safely by negative and exclusion, to what is
affirmative and inclusive.
Francis Bacon, On the Statute of Uses1The concept of freedom is a pure concept of reason. It does not constitute an object of any theoretical
knowledge that is possible for us; and it can by no means be valid as a constitutive principle of
speculative reason, but can be valid only as a regulative and, indeed, merely negative principle of
speculative reason.
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298 NASIR1 | Introduction
One of the key arguments of Jeremy Bentham against the French Declaration of Rights (the 1789 Declaration of the
Rights of Man and of the Citizen) concerned the syntax of the document. The reader of the Declaration could easily be
deluded into thinking that the rights enshrined in the text were virtually limitless, because no explicit reference was
made to limits, restrictions and exceptions.3J. Bowr
4Ibid.
5Bowrin
6E.g., M.
‘Governi
Bulley, ‘G
On the G
(2015), 3
Annual R
and SociSuppose a declaration to this effect: No man's liberty shall be abridged in any point. This, it is evident, would
be an useless extravagance, which must be contradicted by every law that came to be made.3This is what justified Bentham's characterisation of the Declaration as ‘nonsense upon stilts’: ‘This, we see, is
nothing: It leaves the law just as free and unfettered as it found it’.4
One need not agree with Bentham's full theory of rights to be of the view that he had a point when he
emphasised the importance of limits and restrictions in the full and proper definition of rights. Quoting Bentham again:
‘No law can be made that does not take something from liberty; those excepted which take away, in the whole or in
part, those laws which take away from liberty’.5 In other words, rights have to be set in their socio‐economic and polit-
ical context, something which requires focusing on the formally ‘negative’ side of rights, that is, on limitation clauses,
exceptions and anti‐abuse provisions. Limitations and restrictions not only render the definition complete, but also
play a fundamental role in shaping and moulding the very understanding of rights entertained by rights‐holders. It
can thus be argued that fundamental rights play a key role in the governing of European societies, not only by
affirming certain normative standards (and in the process producing normative knowledge) but also by deeply shaping
the way in which the addressees of the law regard themselves and their environment.
In this article, I offer a systematic reconstruction of the ‘negative’ clauses of the European Convention on Human
Rights, in particular its limitation and exception clauses (Section 3), its anti‐abuse clause (Article 18, analysed in Sec-
tion 4) and last, but not least, the clause that restricts the extent to which states can limit or except rights (Article 18,
considered in Section 5). The next section is devoted to exploring the role of rights in the governing of European soci-
eties, in what, following Foucauldian terminology, we may refer to as ‘negative governmentality’, or, more precisely, as
‘negative intergovernmentality’.
One methodological caveat. The article is written across disciplinary and substantive ‘borders’. Quite obviously,
the article speaks to debates in the literature on the European Convention on Human Rights, and more generally,
about the protection of fundamental rights. The key claim in this regard, as already pointed out, is that proper under-
standing of the Convention rights depends on considering not only the ‘positive’ definition of rights, but also their
‘negative side’. It is the latter, as just underlined, that provides an understanding of the systemic relationship between
the different Convention rights, or to put it differently, a systemic reconstruction of the content of the Convention. At
the same time, however, the article engages with the politico‐scientific debates on governmentality, that is, with lit-
erature that focuses on the way conduct is governed.6 In particular, it seems to me that a legally‐grounded analysis
may contribute to filling a major gap in such (i.e., governmentality) analyses, i.e., the extent to which the shaping ofing (ed.), The Works of Jeremy Bentham (William Tait, 1843), at II: 493a.
g, above, n. 3, at II: 493b.
Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France 1977–1978 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); M.A. Nasir,
ng (through) Religion: Reflections on Religion as Governmentality’, (2016) 42 Philosophy & Social Criticism, 873; B. Sokhi‐
overnment(ality) by Experts: Human Rights as Governance’, (2011) 22 Law & Critique, 251; M.A. Nasir, ‘Weighing Words:
overnmentality of Free Speech’, (2016) 25 Social & Legal Studies, 69; M.A. Nasir, ‘Between the Metropole and the Postcolony’,
4 Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 1003; N. Rose, P. O’Malley and M. Valverde, ‘Governmentality’, (2006) 2
eview of Law and Social Science, 83; M.A. Nasir, ‘Biopolitics, Thanatopolitics and the Right to Life’, (2017) 34 Theory, Culture,
ety, 75.
NASIR 299conduct results in prioritising certain types of actions, and, more crucially, in discouraging others. In particular, the
study here proposed shows how a governmental order closes itself to certain practices in order to reproduce itself.2 | THE CONSTITUTION OF FREEDOM: NEGATIVE GOVERNMENTALITY7R. Alexy
8Such a
years tha
the nam
9Schmitt
ity of the
to a seriThe law actively creates liberties, so it always causes—directly or indirectly—losses of liberty … This raises
the question of the correct distribution of liberties.
Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights7Freedom requires both the positive affirmation of moral agency and the constraining of moral agency. There is no
‘raw’ or ‘pure’ understanding of freedom, and consequently, no ‘raw’ or ‘pure’ understanding of rights.
Praxis constitutes (and rationalises) autonomy. Rights are interwoven with collective goods, institutional struc-
tures, rationalities of government, and with law as a means of social integration. Not only the subjective rights of
individuals enter into conflict, but also there are obvious tensions between the protection of the collective goods
on which the effectiveness of the system of rights rests, and the protection of specific and concrete subjective
rights. Furthermore, the very stability of a rights‐based legal system can be undermined by the strategic use of
rights. The holders of rights can make a purely tactical use of their rights with a view to undermining the founda-
tions of the rights‐based legal system and precipitate its demise. The stratagems through which Italian Fascists and
German Nazis rose to power are illustrative in this regard.8 Consequently, the relationship between moral agency
and rights cannot be conceived in value‐neutral terms, at least not when it comes to the underlying principle of
freedom. It is imperative that rights could not be used as the means to undermine democratic constitutionalism.9
To prevent that from happening, it is necessary to flesh out legal obligations, and to operationalise them through
governmental practices, so that the holders of rights do not make use of their freedoms in ways that undermine
freedom systematically. This negative side forms an integral part of full definition of rights and indeed should
not be regarded as extraneous to rights. It is this full definition that makes a system out of a congeries of rights,
and it is the full definition of rights that plays a major role in the shaping of the actual autonomous moral agents,
and in defining the way they see the real and the legal worlds through both the rights and the limits to the rights
that are said to prevail.
It follows from what has just been said that the full definition of rights has to include its ‘negative side’. Not
only what can be done with and through rights, but also what cannot be done with and through rights. This
entails that a formal proclamation of rights is not enough. The ‘morality of freedom’, to use a Razian phrase,
has to be fleshed out. Substantive and concrete choices are required when coming to terms with the limits and
exceptions to rights. It is on the basis of such choices that legal rights are defined (and limited) and, consequently,
freedoms defined (and limited). This results in subjects being required to perform certain actions and abstaining
from others.
The resulting conception of rights is different (and, in my view, goes beyond) two influential conceptions of rights.
The first is that according to which rights are to be identified with a set of ‘subjective’ faculties. This is char-
acteristic of the pre‐political understanding of rights, which plays a major role not only in contractarian theories of, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Oxford University Press, 2002), at 158 (original emphasis).
claim does not belittle at all the massive risk posed by actual public authorities breaching rights. The last century and the few
t have lapsed of the present one have been witness to massive rights violations by state actors, not infrequently justified in
e of various crises and emergencies.
notes in Legality and Legitimacy (Duke University Press, 2004): ‘There is no middle road between the principled value neutral-
functionalist system of legality and the principled value emphasis of the substantive constitutional guarantees … Compared
ously intended value assertion and affirmation, conscientious value neutrality means a denial of values’ (at 47).
300 NASIRrights, but also in the conceptualisation of economic freedoms in the case law and secondary law of the EU. This
understanding is reductionist because it misses the crucial point that actual freedom critically depends on legal
standards and governmental practices. In fact, rights require for their effectiveness institutional discipline (and sup-
port). It is doubtful whether actual freedom exists outside the institutional context. The right to an autonomous life
cannot be said to be guaranteed if people are placed at a major risk of living short and unhealthy lives, the prison
system is in ruins, the economy fails, neighbouring states are belligerent, and children are not sent to schools by
their parents. The idea of an autonomous life becomes meaningless without governmental discipline. The latter
is a necessary condition for freedom to be both socially established and individually exercised in a satisfactory
manner. Thus, limits and exceptions to rights are Janus‐faced. On the one hand, such limits and exceptions restrain
individual freedom and empower the state; at the same time, it is such limits and restrictions that render freedom
possible and limit the power of public institutions by setting their legitimate scope. What emerges is the very prin-
ciple of the rule of law, to the extent that the latter wards off not only arbitrary exercises of legal and political
power, but also reproachable patterns of action and conduct from legal subjects.10 The former constitutes a nec-
essary guarantee of freedom. The latter ensures the regulation of subjects through freedom. Both go hand in hand.
The second is the characterisation of rights as mere reflexes of objective law. Rights would have no autonomous
substance or content, but would be merely a way of referring to the content of ‘objective’ law. By the same token,
declarations of rights would have to be understood as just a reflex of the way power is organised in society.11 It
goes without saying that such an understanding of rights has a rather sinister lineage. Still, such a conception tends
to re‐emerge with force when there is a founded or unfounded perception that the stability of the polity is being seri-
ously threatened. The recent series of European crises fit into this pattern. The overlapping of financial, fiscal, eco-
nomic and ‘security’ crisis in the EU, and very especially the Eurozone, have paved the way to specific policy
proposals and general discourses that ‘objectivise’ rights. That does not make such an understanding more plausible.
Once we observe that the definition of rights has to comprise their ‘negative’ side, we are bound to observe that
rights do not only determine standards of conduct (by means of producing normative knowledge) but they also play a
major role in shaping and moulding the mentality of rights‐holders, very especially on what concerns the ‘negative’
side of rights. Thus, limitation and exception clauses are part of ‘negative’ (inter)governmentality, which, among
others, crucially cultivates a specific mentality of rights‐holders that guarantees that freedom is exerted in ways that
ensure the stability of the democratic constitutional order. It is banal to say that any legal system is premised on the
expectation that legal norms will be complied with by their addressees. And still, law cannot produce by itself
addressees that regard the legal system as legitimate (in fact, positive law cannot produce by itself the very reasons
that ground its legitimacy).12 As a result, there is no guarantee that the legal constitution of freedom would result
in compliance with the law on the side of those to whom it is addressed.
Democratic constitutional theory suggests that individuals should be both authors of (active agents) and subject
to (targets and objects) the law.13 Autonomy and consent are coupled not through law itself, but through participatory10Rule of law, Hayek notes, means ‘that government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand—rules which
make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how authority will use its coercive power in given circumstances, and to plan one’s indi-
vidual affairs on the basis of this knowledge’ (F. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (first published 1944, Routledge 2001) at 75–76). Cf. J.
Raz, ‘The Rule of Law and its Virtue’, (1997) 93 Law Quarterly Review, 195. In Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom, App. no. 6538/74
(ECtHR, 26 April 1979), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22appno%22:[%226538/74%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001‐57583%22]},
the ECtHR noted: ‘A norm cannot be regarded as a “law” unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to reg-
ulate his conduct’ (§49).
11Such a trend is reflected, most notably, in a few of the major writings of Carl Schmitt, Lorenz von Stein and Sergio Panunzio.
12J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (Cambridge University Press,
1996), at 358–359. Post calls this the ‘paradox of public discourse’, that the law may not be used to enforce the civility rules that make
rational deliberation possible (R. Post, Constitutional Domains (Harvard University Press, 1995), at 146–147).
13E.g., Habermas, above, n. 12, at 113–123.
NASIR 301and civic structures which foster living conditions in which individuals are safe, schooled and healthy, integrated into
economic structures based on reciprocity, and so on and so forth.14 General reasonability is tied to universal accept-
ability.15 The law cannot establish the very conditions of its own legitimacy. By the same token, subjects to the law
may undermine the stability of the law by means of a strategic abuse of their rights. It would then be mistaken to
reconstruct expressions of choice and opinion, coming hand in hand with the subversion of law through law, as exer-
cises of self‐legislation, popular sovereignty, and consent and its legitimacy. Limitations and restrictions undermining
the abuse of agency are required. In such circumstances, and only in such circumstances, actions and governmental
practices are required to uphold the rights‐based legal system.16 Consequently, those societies
that constitutionalise human rights but lack practices addressing conduct that human rights structurally presuppose
(e.g., political transparency, independence of judiciary, professional civil service, strong economy), i.e., practices that
rationalise what autonomous life is and what not, remain unable to either guarantee human rights effectively or to
shield rights‐based norms from the possibility of systemic threats.17
Negative governmentality builds a bridge between the form of the legal system and the substantive content of
the norms that are part of it. A purely formal understanding, for example, of procedural standards ignores the extent
to which they remain substantively nested with constitutional principles. Thus, constitutional principles define proce-
dural standards in contextual (e.g., forms of behaviour that procedure considers relevant), normative (e.g., presuppo-
sition of rational will‐formation), and systemic (e.g., the role and scope of procedural standards in certain key political
institutions) terms. In other words, the formal aspect of democratic procedures interrelates with the legal rules that
determine the shape of the legal system, i.e., democratic constitutional system. In the same vein, formal, procedural
analysis of law is always insufficient, because it does not take into account the fundamental importance of the tension
between form and substance, or what is the same, the eventuality that formal compliance may result in substantive
infringement. Means and ends are necessarily interconnected in law‐making and law adjudication and implementation.
The outcome of a procedure is to be regarded as legitimate if, and only if, the outcome is in line with the normative
conditions that render the procedure legitimate. Consequently, groups or political parties cannot legitimise their anti‐
constitutional activities either by participating in the procedure or by complying with procedural standards only in a14In order to supplement legal rules with an apt political character of a society, Kelsen notes that ‘in practice, civic education is one of
the principle demands’ of the democratic constitutional order. He further notes: ‘All education, it is true, is based on the relationship
between teacher and student—an intellectual form of the leader‐follower relation—and therefore (in a good sense) essentially author-
itarian in character. Nevertheless, the problem of democracy presents itself in social practice as an educational problem on the
grandest scale’ (The Essence and Value of Democracy (Rowman & Littlefield, 1929), at 95). In a similar vein, Rorty notes: ‘Producing gen-
erations of nice, tolerant, well‐off, secure, other‐respecting students in all parts of the world is just what is needed—indeed, all that is
needed—to achieve an Enlightenment utopia. The more youngsters like this we can raise, the stronger and more global our human
rights culture will become’, The Rorty Reader (Wiley, 2010), at 361.
15Reasonability requires that the rational conditions that establish a free order allow deliberation and choice to an extent that those
conditions are not effectively jeopardised. Normatively, deliberation occurs within such an order, not about ending it. If this gap
between reasonability and rationality is not bridged, one faces a paradox. A famous remark in this regard is Rousseau's: ‘In order
for a nascent people to appreciate sound political maxims and follow the fundamental rules of statecraft, the effect would have to
become the cause; the social spirit, which should be the product of the way in which the country was founded would have to preside
over the founding itself; and, before the creation of the laws, men would have to be what they should become by means of those same
laws’ (The Social Contract at II: ch. 7).
16Raz notes: ‘Since individuals are guaranteed adequate rights of political participation in the liberal state and since such a state is
guided by a public morality expressing concern for individual autonomy, its coercive measures do not express an insult to the auton-
omy of individuals. It is common knowledge that they are motivated not by lack of respect for individual autonomy but by concern for
it. After all, coercion can be genuinely for the good of the coerced and can even be sought by them’, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford
University Press, 1986), at 156–7.
17The question how a rights‐based legal system is to be established cannot be answered exhaustively by referring reflexively to human
rights law. The rationale of negative governmentality closes the legal gap between norms and their implementation. In fact, the effec-
tiveness of human rights depends to the extent that a society interrelates human rights norms with practices prioritising certain con-
duct, and discouraging certain others. Consequently, at moments when a rights‐based legal system is being established, standards like
Article 15, for example, could be retroactively used to justify such legal and political transitions. Once installed, however, such a legal
system can then be used ex post facto to deal with the violations of specific human rights during and prior to such transitions.
302 NASIRformal sense. To the extent that the democratic procedures themselves do not affirm something concrete and remain
rather formal, legal rules underlie their formal basis by delimiting acceptable forms of discursive contributions and by
restricting certain unreasonable inputs and outputs, i.e., by specifying what these procedures are not, what kind of
behaviour remains unacceptable, and what kind of uses participants cannot put them to.18
In sum, under the heading of ‘negatively governmentality’, primarily three related things, within a legal system, can
be analysed.
First, it is shaping freedom. This extends to identifying what cannot be done through freedom. Such constriction
helps shape autonomy and its agents.
Second, it is analysing abuse of freedom. This requires focusing on the essence of (un)freedom. It entails studying
the function of those rationalities that identify subversive conduct, practices that manage it, standards that elaborate
the befitting way to deal with them, and strategies that bring an abusive subject back within the legal context.
Third, it is legally regulating abuse. This relates the problem of preserving a legal system back to the legal rules.
Thus, negative governmentality extends to the question of developing practices of government whose task is to
ensure that free subjects do not govern themselves in an abusive manner. It is the social task of those legal structures
that seek to uphold a culture of autonomy to determine in what manner can freedoms be, in Alexy's words, ‘correctly
distributed’ for subjects spread over a range of socio‐political formations.3 | LIMITATION AND ‘EXCEPTION ’ CLAUSES18With a
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droit’, (1Autonomy is only possible in a framework of constraints.
Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom193.1 | The structural role of limitation and exception clauses
Limitation and exception clauses qualify and calibrate ECHR rights by setting them in their wider social, economic and
political context. They perform three main functions. Firstly, these clauses open rights up to various notions of the
collective good (including economic well‐being, territorial integrity, health and safety, the maintenance of law and
order), preventing that ‘law [refers] only to law’.20 Secondly, it is through limitation and exception clauses that the
guarantee of rights is related to the specific and concrete governmental practices intended to shape the conduct of
legal subjects. Thirdly, limitation clauses and exceptions reconcile social change (leading to different understandings
of what the collective good entails) with legal determination. In particular, the interplay between abstract rights andn awareness that certain ‘unreasonable’ doctrines may find it impossible ‘to abide by constitutional regime except as a modus
at 489), Rawls believes that it is important that a free society develop legal standards that do not consider inputs from these
s as equally legitimate in the overall legitimation pool in Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 2005). He notes: ‘[The]
e [of unreasonable doctrines] sets a limit to the aim of fully realizing a reasonable democratic society with its ideal of public
nd the idea of legitimate law. This fact is not a defect or failure of the idea of public reason, but rather it indicates that there
s to what public reason can accomplish’ (at 489). Further: ‘That there are [unreasonable] doctrines that reject one or more
tic freedom is itself a permanent fact of life, or seems so. This gives us the practical task of containing them—like war and
so that they do not overturn political justice’ (at 64). Thus, although future generations, from a legal perspective, do not hold
t because they are inexistent (and, consequently cannot have their legal rights violated or, even for that matter, have them
d by a court), the legal standards shaping, restricting and conditioning the freedoms of existing rights‐holders (i.e., negative
entality) ensure that future generations inherit a legal system that would treat them as rights‐holders. Cf. J. Rawls, Justice
ss (Harvard University Press, 2001), at 159).
ove, n. 16, at 155.
in Schütz, ‘L’immaculée conception de l’interpète et l’émergence du système juridique: A propos de fictionet construction en
995) 21 Droits, 120, cited in G. Agamben, State of Exception (University of Chicago Press, 2005), at 26.
NASIR 303context renders possible a stable, and still open to change, interpretative framework of constitutional standards, in this
case, ECHR standards.213.2 | Limitation clauses21In Soe
[%22140
instrume
guards p
22Golder
70%22],
23Thus,
pursuanc
tation, a
24See, P
[%22931
July 200
25‘Const2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of
others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the
authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
Article 10(2) ECHR, Right to freedom of expressionLimitation clauses (Table 1) are a defining element of the right being limited. This does not entail that they are an
‘inherent’ part of the right,22 but rather have a relevance of their own, as clauses which identify the protective reach of
each right by reference to the values and objectives that underpin it. To put it differently, by setting the rightful scope
within which a right can be limited, limitation clauses specify the substantive content and the purpose of the limiting
act.23 Resultantly, the conduct of the addressees of the law is regulated in view of the objectives underpinning the
limitation clauses, at the very same time that the limited right is afforded legal protection. This is reflected in the fact
that when constructing the limitation clauses, the ECtHR has engaged in analysing the justifiability of the specific
interferences which presupposes (at least to a relevant extent) the legitimacy of the interferences. To illustrate the
point: When the ECtHR finds that activities that cause noise (within certain limits) are justified, despite limiting the
right to respect for private life (including privacy of the home),24 the Court is affirming that a wide understanding
of economic well‐being determines (and defines) the concrete rights enjoyed by the plaintiffs.
What has just been said entails that it is the limitation of rights that defines what it means to live in a society that
assigns a central value to autonomy. If we consider the case law of the ECtHR systematically, we will conclude that an
autonomous life is defined, for example, as the life of individuals who are members of a territorially secure state, in
which they enjoy participation in a performing economy with low levels of unemployment, and in which they enjoy
access to education and health. The very fact that I am acknowledged rights entails that I can challenge the concrete
interpretation of the rights I enjoy, including the limits to those rights. What I cannot challenge is the existence, ratio-
nale and function of limits to rights. In other words, while the specific configuration of the limits and exceptions to
rights can be challenged, the constitutive role of limitations cannot be challenged. As was pointed above, but is per-
haps worth repeating now, limitation clauses and limiting practices have a constitutive character and effect which lies
at the core of not only individual autonomy but also of an autonomous society.25 At the same time, however, it is ofring v. the United Kingdom, App. no. 14038/88 (ECtHR, 7 July 1989), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22appno%22:
38/88%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001‐57619%22]}, the ECtHR noted that ‘the object and purpose of the Convention as an
nt for the protection of individual human beings require that its provisions be interpreted and applied so as to make its safe-
ractical and effective’ (§87).
v. the UK, App. no. 4451/70 (ECtHR, 21 February 1975), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22appno%22:[%224451/
%22itemid%22:[%22001‐57496%22]}, §21, 40.
the test performed by the ECtHR in its case law of discerning whether rights have been interfered with in a proportionate
e of ‘legitimate aims’ is crucial. It in turn makes the interfering measure legitimate, shifting this concept of judicial interpre-
s an effect, from focusing on ends to the determination of proper means.
owell and Rayner v. the UK, App. no. 9310/81 (ECtHR, 21 February 1990), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22appno%22:
0/81%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001‐57622%22]}, §37–45, and Hatton and Others v. the UK, App. no. 36022/97 (ECtHR, 8
3), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22appno%22:[%2236022/97%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001‐61188%22]}, §116–130.
itutional rights can only be limited by or on the basis of norms likewise with constitutional status’, Alexy, above, n. 7, at 185.
TABLE 1 Limitation clauses: Articles 8–11
ECHR Articles
Article 8 ECHR. Right to
Respect for private and
family life
Article 9 ECHR.
Freedom of thought,
conscience, and
religion
Article 10 ECHR.
Freedom of expression
Article 11 ECHR.
Freedom of
assembly and
association
Paragraphs that
mention
limitations to
the rights that
their
corresponding
article protects
Article 8(2) ECHR. There
shall be no
interference by a
public authority with
the exercise of this
right except such as is:
Article 9(2) ECHR.
Freedom to manifest
one's religion or
beliefs shall be
subject only to such
limitations as are:
Article 10(2) ECHR. The
exercise of these
freedoms, since it
carries with it duties
and responsibilities,
may be subject to such
formalities, conditions,
restrictions or penalties
as are:
Article 11(2) ECHR.
No restrictions
shall be placed on
the exercise of
these rights other
than such as are:
Compliance with
the law (with
respect to both
its form and its
quality)
in accordance with law prescribed by law prescribed by law prescribed by law
Democratic
necessity
(procedural and
substantive)
and is necessary in a
democratic society
and are necessary in a
democratic society
and are necessary in a
democratic society,
and are necessary in
a democratic
society
Political
necessities
relating to
national
security
in the interests of
national security,
in the interests of national
security,
in the interests of
national security
Political
necessities
relating to
territorial
safety
territorial integrity
Social concerns public safety in the interests of
public safety,
or public safety, or public safety,
Economic
necessities
or the economic well‐
being country,
Maintenance of
law and order
for the prevention of
disorder or crime,
for the protection of
public order,
for the prevention of
disorder or crime,
for the prevention of
disorder or crime,
Public health,
general
welfare, social
policy
for the protection of
health or morals,
health or morals, for the protection of
health or morals,
for the protection of
health or morals
Consideration of
rights and
freedoms of
others
or for the protection of
the rights and
freedoms of others.
or for the protection of
the rights and
freedoms of others.
for the protection of the
reputation or rights of
others,
or for the protection
of the rights and
freedoms of
others.
Protecting
confidentiality
within certain
social,
economic, and
political
institutions
for preventing the
disclosure of
information received in
confidence,
Preserving the
independence
and objectivity
of judicial
bodies
or for maintaining the
authority and
impartiality of the
judiciary.
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NASIR 305vital importance that governmental practices that limit rights are determined and constrained by the very rights they
limit, instead of becoming ends in themselves. To illustrate the point: There may well be very good reasons why the
right of privacy of a specific person or persons has to be limited and restricted. If there were good grounds to conclude
that a certain Mr X is engaged in a criminal conspiracy to undermine national security, a judge would be justified in
ordering the eavesdropping of the communications of Mr X.26 Still, a potential abuse of that state power has to be
prevented through procedural safeguards, including judicial supervision.3.3 | Exception clauses
The ECHR articles also contain certain exceptions. I hereafter refer to them as exception clauses (Table 2). For exam-
ple, the guarantee of the right to life finds its exception when ‘quelling a riot or insurrection’ (Article 2(2c) ECHR).
Broadly speaking, exception clauses perform two related functions. Firstly, exception clauses make certain rights
claims inapplicable within certain domains. For example, Article 4 prohibits forced labour, but the companion excep-
tion clause makes clear that it is not possible to characterise compulsory military recruitment during wartime as forced
labour (Article 4(3b) ECHR).
Secondly, exception clauses make a specific construction of that right (by reference to specific conditions or his-
torical context) part of the normative understanding of the right. For example, Article 5 on the right to liberty and
security applies in a different manner to mentally ill or individuals suffering from infectious diseases. Thus, mentally
ill, alcoholics or individuals suffering from infectious diseases are not primarily detained with a view to bringing them
‘before the competent legal authorities’—which is crucially mentioned in Articles 5(1a–1d) and 5(3) ECHR. Albeit it
presupposes judicial supervision, those that Article 5 ECHR mentions in exceptional terms can be justifiably detained
without a prior court order.27 Similarly, albeit those that are mentioned in exceptional terms remain rights‐holders and
can make Article 5 claims, praxis constitutionalising and rationalising autonomy enables law to interpret their rights in
a contextual, and hence in an exceptional, manner. Simply put, unlike a convicted murderer, I, as a mentally unstable
individual, am detained not for what I have done but for what I am, and thus I am detained primarily for my own ther-
apy and welfare. By the same token, the fact that Article 3 does not foresee exceptions does not entail that the train-
ing of special operation soldiers be abolished because it is inhuman or degrading; doing so would imply constructing
the right in a manner blind to the specific historical and protective context in which it makes sense.28 To put it differ-
ently, exception clauses exempt certain institutional setups, practices and rationalities from the breadth of the rights,
in order to make sense of the way those very rights are to be actualised in society.26See, e.g., Leander v. Sweden, App. no. 9248/81 (ECtHR, 26 March 1987), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22appno%22:[%229248/
81%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001‐57519%22]}, §62; Huvig v. France, App. no. 11105/84 (ECtHR, 24 April 1990), http://hudoc.echr.
coe.int/eng#{%22appno%22:[%2211105/84%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001‐57627%22]}, §33; Malone v. the UK, App. no. 8691/79
(ECtHR, 26 April 1985), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22appno%22:[%228691/79%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001‐57532%22]},
§79, 87.
27See, e.g., Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, App. no. 6301/73 (ECtHR, 24 October 1979), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22appno%
22:[%226301/73%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001‐57597%22]}, §38; Aerts v. Belgium, App. no. 25357/94 (ECtHR, 30 July 1998), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22fulltext%22:[%2225357/94%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001‐58209%22]}, §46; Johnson v. the UK, App.
no. 22520/93 (ECtHR, 24 October 1997), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{“fulltext”:[“22520/93”],”itemid”:[“001‐58110”]}, §61–66;
Koniarska v. the UK, App. no. 33670/96 (ECtHR, 12 October 2000), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22fulltext%22:
[%22\%2233670/96\%22%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001‐5480%22]}, The Law.
28In her study of the structure of war in the twentieth century, historian Joanna Burke notes: ‘In all military training programs, the fun-
damental process was the same: individuals had to be broken down to be rebuilt into efficient fighting men. The basic tenets included
depersonalisation, uniforms, lack of privacy, forced social relationships, tight schedules, lack of sleep, disorientation followed by rites
of reorganisation according to military codes, arbitrary rules, and strict punishment. These methods of brutalisation were similar to
those carried out in regimes where men were taught to torture prisoners: the difference resided in the degree of violence involved,
not its nature’ (An Intimate History of Killing: Face‐to‐Face Killing in Twentieth‐Century Warfare (Basic Books, 1999), at 67).
TABLE 2 Exception clauses: Articles 2, 4, 5, and (to an extent)29 6 and 11
ECHR Articles
Article 2 ECHR.
Right to life
Article 4 ECHR.
Prohibition of
slavery and forced
labour
Article 5 ECHR.
Right to liberty
and security
Article 6 ECHR.
Right to a fair trial
Article 11 ECHR.
Freedom of
assembly and
association
Paragraphs that
mention
exceptions to
the rights that
their
corresponding
article protects
Article 2(2) ECHR.
Deprivation of
life shall not be
regarded as
inflicted in
contravention of
this Article when
it results from
the use of force
which is no
more than
absolutely
necessary:
Article 4(3) ECHR.
For the purpose
of this article the
term ‘forced or
compulsory
labour’ shall not
include:
Article 5(1) ECHR.
Everyone has
the right to
liberty and
security of
person. No one
shall be deprived
of his liberty
save in the
following cases
and in
accordance with
a procedure
prescribed by
law:
Article 6(1)
ECHR.30 In the
determination of
his civil rights
and obligations
or of any
criminal charge
against him,
everyone is
entitled to a fair
and public
hearing …
judgment shall
be pronounced
publicly but the
press and public
may be excluded
from all or part
of the trial:
Article 11(2). This
article shall not
prevent the
imposition of
lawful
restrictions on
the exercise of
these rights by
members:
Pre‐empting or
countering
that violence
which is
unlawful
(2a) in defence of
any person from
unlawful
violence;
Necessity of
lawful
detention and
legitimacy of
prison as an
institution
(2b) in order to
effect a lawful
arrest or to
prevent the
escape of a
person lawfully
detained;
(3a) any work
required to be
done in the
ordinary course
of detention
imposed
according to
the provisions
of Article 5 of
this Convention
or during
conditional
release from
such detention;
(1a) the lawful
detention of a
person after
conviction by a
competent
court;
(1b) the lawful
arrest or
detention of a
person for non‐
compliance with
the lawful order
of a court or in
order to secure
the fulfilment of
any obligation
prescribed by
law;
(1c) the lawful
arrest or
detention of a
person effected
for the purpose
of bringing him
before the
competent legal
authority on
reasonable
suspicion of
having
committed an
offence or when
it is reasonably
considered
(Continues)
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ECHR Articles
Article 2 ECHR.
Right to life
Article 4 ECHR.
Prohibition of
slavery and forced
labour
Article 5 ECHR.
Right to liberty
and security
Article 6 ECHR.
Right to a fair trial
Article 11 ECHR.
Freedom of
assembly and
association
necessary to
prevent his
committing an
offence or
fleeing after
having done so;
Defence related
necessities and
the legitimacy
of military as
an institution
(3b) any service of
a military
character or, in
case of
conscientious
objectors in
countries where
they are
recognised,
service exacted
instead of
compulsory
military service;
of the armed
forces,
Countering
threats to
public order
and collective
well‐being
(2c) in action
lawfully taken
for the purpose
of quelling a riot
or insurrection.
(3c) any service
exacted in case
of an emergency
or calamity
threatening the
life or well‐being
of the
community;
in the interest of
public order or
national security
in a democratic
society, of
morals
Law and order
related
necessities and
the legitimacy
of police as an
institution
of the police or
of the
administration
of the State.
Civic obligations (3d) any work or
service which
forms part of
normal civic
obligations.
Considerations of
the welfare of
children, and
the legitimacy
of
corresponding
institutions
(i.e., schools,
care
institutions,
juvenile
centres)
(1d) the detention
of a minor by
lawful order for
the purpose of
educational
supervision or
his lawful
detention for
the purpose of
bringing him
before the
competent legal
authority;
where the
interests of
juveniles …
so require
Health‐related
considerations,
and the
legitimacy of
corresponding
(1e) the lawful
detention of
persons for the
prevention of
the spreading of
(Continues)
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TABLE 2 (Continued)
ECHR Articles
Article 2 ECHR.
Right to life
Article 4 ECHR.
Prohibition of
slavery and forced
labour
Article 5 ECHR.
Right to liberty
and security
Article 6 ECHR.
Right to a fair trial
Article 11 ECHR.
Freedom of
assembly and
association
institutions
(i.e., hospitals,
asylums,
rehabilitation
centres,
detention
wards)
infectious
diseases, of
persons of
unsound mind,
alcoholics or
drug addicts or
vagrants;
Political necessity
relating to
state's
management
of entry into
and exit from
their territories
(1f) the lawful
arrest or
detention of a
person to
prevent his
effecting an
unauthorised
entry into the
country or of a
person against
whom action is
being taken with
a view to
deportation or
extradition.
Other
unforeseen,
special
circumstances
or to the extent
strictly
necessary in the
opinion of the
court in special
circumstances
where publicity
would prejudice
the interests of
justice.
29Both Articles 6 and 11 simultaneously exhibit the tendencies of appreciating certain exceptions and determining certain limita-
tions.Whereas Article 11(2) mentions ‘restrictions’, it ends bymentioning an important exception. Similarly, whereas Article 6(1)
‘excludes’ certain parties from ‘all or part of the trial’, its opening clause limits complaints to civil and criminal cases (rather than
complaints relating to administrativemeasures, for example).Moreover, the interpretation of Article 6 by the Convention organs
has made room for certain ‘limitations by implication’ on the rights it protects (Golder, above, n. 22, §38) that, even when not
mentioned in the text of the article, are necessary in order to place this article in its proper context (cf. Stanev v. Bulgaria,
App. no. 36760/06 (ECtHR, 17 January 2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001‐108690%22]},
§230). Thus, the case law of Article 6 ECHR talks about equality of arms, proportionality betweenmeans employed by the public
authorities and the legitimate aims they wanted to achieve, balance between time given to defence and the overall time of the
trial, among others. However, to the extent that the text of Article 6 does not mention limitations, and the case law does not
analyse the applicability of the right first and then reconstruct proper limitations systematically, it appears conceptually mistaken
to list Article 6 with those articles that explicitly contain limitation clauses. Nevertheless, attention must be paid to the overall
context in which the Convention organs interpret Article 6 as an important non‐derogable right and the way they consider how
the imposition of limitations on this right by public authorities remains compatible with guarantee of an effective and fair trial.
30Article 6(1) only deals with the aspect of ‘publicness’ in the context of trial and judgment. This does not function as a limitation
clause, despite delimiting the breadth of ‘publicness’. Article 6(1) simply ‘excludes press and public’ in certain situations from ‘all or
part of the trial’; it does not seek to balance various aspects. In other words, albeit the exceptions relating to publicness men-
tioned inArticle 6(1) chimewith limitationsmentioned inArticles 8–11 (i.e., public order, national security, in the interests of soci-
ety or of morals), Article 6(1)'s keyword refers to exclusion (i.e., ‘excluded’) rather than ‘interferences’ (Article 8(2)), ‘limitations’
(Article 9(2)), or ‘restrictions’ (Articles 10(2) and 11(2)). Moreover, whereas the case law of Articles 8–11 balances limiting mea-
sures vis‐à‐vis specific rights, Article 6(1) looks at the substance of the procedure to see whether its formwas tailored as per the
circumstances, i.e., with respect to exceptional, important, or relevant reasons, without needing to develop any step‐by‐step
interpretive test that ultimately determines the legal interpretation of rights guaranteed by Article 6. Thus, the ‘closedness’ of
the trial in certain cases, with reference to specific conditions, remains part of the normative understanding of Article 6(1) right.
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between the individual and public authorities, in particular special and intense relations of subjection (those character-
istic of soldiers, prisoners, vagrants, mentally or physically ill), which in many cases unfold within specific institutional
structures (the army, hospitals, asylums, isolation wards, social support institutions, and so on) and depend on certain
forms of knowledge (military sciences, medical expertise, psychiatry and psychology, social policy and welfare dis-
course). Precisely which set of rights applies to one's case and what precise interpretation those rights merit depend
on the specific terms of such a relationship. Calibration of rights through exceptions renders clear the limits of rights
narratives that reduce rights to mere reflexes of objective law. The position in which each specific person stands in
relation to the law cannot be determined in purely formal legal terms, not even by reference to the rights that stem
from the specific status that person enjoys. That is why, for example, a state may train its soldiers to kill and require
them to expose themselves to mortal dangers. The ECtHR has found that this does not entail either the violation of
the right to life of the soldiers or forcing soldiers to violate the right to life of others. Similarly, in X v. Germany, the
Court found that actions aiming at preventing prisoners from committing suicide were justified, even if the very same
actions would, say, result in the violation of the right to liberty of persons not being imprisoned. Human rights stan-
dards do not determine, for example, why a state must possess legitimate violence at all or why imprisonment should
function as a social practice. Still, and this is important to stress, human rights identify the threshold of legitimate
violence by the state and the level of suffering that can be imposed through confinement.3.4 | The case law of the ECtHR on exceptions and limitations
The case law of the ECtHR on limitation clauses and exceptions has underlined the central role they play in the con-
figuration of the Convention system of rights. The Court has confirmed that limitations and exceptions set rights in
their socio‐economic context, something which proves the flawed character of a non‐political—in the sense of being
pre‐political, ‘natural’—understanding of rights (Section 3.4.1). Moreover, limitations and exceptions are key in the
democratic authorship and legitimation of rights (Section 3.4.2). Finally, limitation and exception clauses open up
the definition of Convention rights to context and to the diversity of possible personal statuses, i.e., epistocracy (Sec-
tion 3.4.3) and plurality and limits to rights (Section 3.4.4).3.4.1 | Limitation clauses and exceptions prove that the ECHR rights are not pre‐political rights
When referring to both limitations and exceptions to rights, the ECtHR makes constant reference to collective and
individual interests. It is indeed because legal freedoms are deemed to be both a manifestation of interests and to
guard such interests31 (individual or collective) that ‘balances’ between rights and goods can be struck without
undermining freedom. This does not necessarily result in freedom being undermined, but on the scope of freedom
being determined by reference to both the substantive aspects of rights (e.g., liberty, private life, free speech) and
the governmental practices that necessarily result from a specific legal‐political setup (e.g., confinement, economic
progress, territorial integrity). This very act of delimitation of the sphere within which individuals are actually free
to act renders possible the emergence of freedom as something other than a mere individual capacity: that is, as an
organising social principle. In other words, it is the guarantee of rights in conjunction with the limitations and excep-
tions to rights that defines freedom in legal terms. The grounding of human rights in their legal and social context
through the limitation and exception clauses entails that the ECHR is based on the rejection of the pre‐political31See, e.g., Raz, above, n. 16, at 31, 176, 190–2, and M. Kramer, ‘Rights Without Trimmings’, in M. Kramer, N. Simmonds and H. Steiner
(eds.), A Debate over Rights (Oxford University Press, 1998), at 7–11. As a conceptual tool in politics, ‘interest’ is assumed to be calcu-
lable (so that it can be approximated and measured), variable (so that it can be taken up, can change over time, and be abandoned) and
generalisable (so that different interests can be neutralised and added up). This understanding permeates the rationale of electoral pol-
itics (so that different individual votes can be compared, substituted and statistically analysed) and the ends that a democratic polity
proposes to itself (so that it can follow ‘collective interests’ and prevent ‘sectional interests’).
310 NASIRcharacter of rights, and consequently, of natural law theories.32 In other words, the ECHR rights can only be under-
stood and approached by reference to a certain and specific praxis. Freedom emerges procedurally and relationally,
and cannot be identified as a specific ‘natural’ feature of unencumbered individuals.3.4.2 | The democratic authorship of rights
Among all the limitations mentioned in ECHR, the test performed by the ECtHR to determine whether an interfering
measure is ‘necessary in democratic society’ has proved to be one of the most demanding in its case law. This test has
resulted in decisions in favour of the claimants’ rights in a significant number of cases.33
The ECHR was forged on the assumption that the political system of all the signatory states was, and would
remain, democratic. Indeed, the ECHR is premised on the foundational intertwinement of democracy and human
rights. Democracy is thus characterised both as the bulwark of rights (and of the protection of the interests of
rights‐holders) and as a powerful ground to constrain the exercise of rights (so as to protect all rights, all genuine social
and individual interests).34 In other words: on the one hand, all limits to rights are expected to be established through a
democratic law‐making process; on the other hand, a key set of ‘limits’ to the ECHR rights is to be defined by refer-
ence to what is required to uphold and sustain democracy, i.e., to the test of ‘being necessary in a democratic society’.
Two socio‐political effects of the intertwinement of democracy and rights are especially noteworthy.
Firstly, by considering that rights require both democratic authorship and legal determination, the ECHR affirms
that democracy, and democracy only, can uphold and enforce rights. This is why the ECHR states, as democratic pol-
ities, can be acknowledged: (1) a margin of discretion in guaranteeing rights; (2) a margin of error when failing to pro-
tect rights; (3) the possibility of recalibrating the protection of certain rights (within bounds and limits) in emergency
situations. Were the ECHR states to lapse in their democratic character, such margins would cease to be acknowl-
edged (besides their very membership being imperilled). Not by chance, the former European Commission of Human
Rights was not convinced when the Greek colonels invoked the state of emergency to derogate from Convention
rights (cf. Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Netherlands v. Greece).35
Secondly, by construing rights as principles which underpin the functioning of democracy, the ECHR constrains
democracy through the very standards that make up and define democracy. The tension between rights and democ-
racy is inherent and internal to democracy itself, and accounts for the fact that the substantive content of rights does32Georg Jellinek notes that ‘the legal system adds something to the freedom of action of the individual, which that individual does not
by nature have (der Handlungsfähigkeit des Individuums etwas hinzufügen, was es von Natur aus nicht besitzt)’ (System der subjektiven
öffentlichen Rechte (first published 1892, Mohr Siebeck, 2011), at 47). Importantly, Article 1 ECHR doubly challenges ascribing any nat-
ural law interpretation to the human rights the Convention protects. First, ECHR relies on the actual consent of the signatory states as
‘the High Contracting Parties’ to secure ECHR rights ‘within their jurisdiction’. The Convention's human rights system structurally
remains inactive without this prior consent or commitment. Of course, if a state withdraws its consent from the ECHR, it does not
meant that it extinguishes all of its obligations based on human rights norms, but only that the Convention machinery does not apply
to it. Further, Article 1 ECHR avoids referring to any idea of the human essence from which all human rights flow, unlike Article 1 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (e.g., reason and conscience). The ECHR simply mentions human rights; it does not justify
them. The discourse of European human rights law lacks such an essentialist principle because inserting metaphysical ideas would
impose one's own thick standards on the others and limit the possibility of domestic consensus on human rights. Natural law, however,
relies neither on consent nor on consensus.
33Steven Greer notes: ‘The phrase “necessary in a democratic society” is arguably one of the most important clauses in the entire Con-
vention since, in principle, it gives the Strasbourg organs the widest possible discretion in condoning or condemning interferences with
rights which states seek to justify by reference to one or more of the legitimate purposes in the second paragraphs of Articles 8 to 11’
(The Exceptions to Articles 8 to 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe Publishing, 1997), at 14).
34Ibid.
35In this sense, Article 15 ECHR presumes democracy both as a process (so that it is legitimate to invoke it when democratisation is
being strengthened) and as a peculiar legal subject (so that the use of Article 15 is permitted only when the invoking state is a dem-
ocratic state). In one sense, democracy is achieved by asserting itself. In another sense, democracy is saved by preventing its violent
overthrow. MacDonald J notes: ‘A state of emergency declared not to further democracy, but to destroy or repress it, would be invalid
under Article 15’ (‘Derogations under Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights’, (1998) 1–2, Columbia Journal of Trans-
national Law, 225, 226).
NASIR 311not depend, as the content of ordinary law may depend, on the change of the ruling majority. The procedural structure
of the ordinary law‐making is presumed to generate legitimate norms, but does not by itself guarantee compliance
with constitutional standards. In a narrow sense, democracy refers to a specific procedure of law and decision‐making
(i.e., parliamentary democracy). In a wider sense, democracy refers to a wider social setup, in which democratic legit-
imacy is embedded in constitutional principles, principles that have a legitimacy and stability higher to those of dem-
ocratic proceduralism in a narrow sense. The ECHR relates to the second and wider conception of democracy.
Therefore, even when democracy as a political procedure falters (so that rights‐holders have to be protected from
threatening majorities) (e.g., Refah, §§89, 95, 99, 102–103) or recedes (so that the courts bypass the democratic com-
petence of the legislature) (e.g., Dudgeon, §61), the constitutional structure contains resources to uphold democracy in
a wider sense. To put it differently, the rule of law, understood in a wider democratic and social sense, is not grounded
on reflexive democratic law making only, but more deeply in a normative commitment to the democratic constitu-
tional system. This is why it might become necessary to rule against procedurally enacted positive laws (as we will
see in the next two sections of this essay, i.e., 4 and 5, in relation to Articles 17 and 18 ECHR).
In sum, the democratic constitutional system connects freedom with constitutional rights and democratic proce-
dures on the one hand, and with specific collective objectives and governmental practices on the other. Autonomous
moral agency becomes possible in such a ‘framework of constraints’, as Raz phrases it.3.4.3 | Epistocracy and limits to rights
Similarly, it is important to notice that a number of the notions that are key in the drafting of limitation and exception
clauses, such as ‘interests of public safety’ or ‘protection of health’, refer to established standards of scientific exper-
tise and discourses, regulatory practices, and professional protocols. This means that it would be too simplifying to
affirm that the limits to rights are set by legislative prerogative, or even for that matter, judicial prerogative.36 Reality
is more complex, to the extent that such legislative and judicial interventions are determined by prevailing social stan-
dards regarding what constitutes relevant expert knowledge. By the same token, we can look at the ‘margin of appre-
ciation’ that is so central in the balancing of rights and collective interests. We can see that it is reductive to conclude
that this doctrine is defined by the exercise of power by the national government, without taking into account the
wider socio‐economic parameters crucial in the balancing act.3.4.4 | Plurality and limits to rights
Importantly, if practices making human rights intelligible are diverse and dissimilar, it means that the idea of autonomy
is likewise heterogeneous. For example, what kind of treatment is considered as befitting an autonomous life is differ-
ent in the case of, say, a mentally unstable person, a terminally ill patient, an imprisoned convict or a serving soldier.
Autonomy cannot be defined obliterating such differences or, for that matter, downplaying the rationalities that
define autonomy in specific contexts. Divorcing the definition of social and political freedoms from the context in
which they operate fails to take the fact into account that freedom becomes meaningful only against a background
of actual practices. For example, a child in a free society is autonomous when he is properly disciplined through edu-
cation, and his parents are not free to deny him education at all. By the same token, identifying discursive inputs from
rights‐holders as the source of freedom does not capture the way regulation of subjects takes place without or against
their consent, let alone their inputs. For example, in the care proceedings relating to Article 8 on the right to respect
for private and family life, the idea as to what is to be understood by ‘the welfare of the child’ or ‘child's best interests’
is based on observations from national social workers, expert psychologists, teachers and welfare authorities, among
others. Professional voices from particular vantage points contribute to shape the normative notions associated with
autonomy. Similarly, a managerial control over lives evades being captured in discourse‐based terms alone. For36This is apart from the fact that the legislature can only address issues in their generality, which for their concrete determination fall
on the judiciary. This fact makes the judicial practice of ‘balancing’ not only unavoidable but also expedient. It is expedient in the sense
that there is no general rule of concrete limitation that in effect reduces a legal right to a nominal status.
312 NASIRexample, even if punishment is understood in terms of a communication theory,37 it cannot account for the
rationalisation and function of, for example, supervisory observation, spatial distribution, or daily routine patterning
of prisoners in a prison setup. Likewise, rights cannot be relied on to influence and eventually limit or constrain the
profiling of convicts based on their crime and danger in a prison setup. Nevertheless, rights can be used to determine
whether an act of profiling in a prison setup is racially discriminatory. Ironically, if a theoretical exposition of rights is
not connected to the way rights become meaningful, then that theoretical exposition puts the burden of proof on the
practice itself to conform to its theoretical model.4 | ABUSE OF RIGHTS: FREEDOM VERSUS RIGHTS?37C. Ben
tice and
tance’, (2
38In Vog
91%22],
defendin
22appnoNothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to
engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set
forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention.
Article 17 ECHR: Prohibition of abuse of rightsLimitation and exception clauses do not exhaust the complete definition of rights as a system. When making deci-
sions based on Articles 2–16 of the Convention, the general assumption underlying the ECtHR case law is that the
overall legal system is functional and compliant. With this background of structural legality, only specific instances
appear a problem question, i.e., the manner in which a legal system guarantees rights, the extent to which procedural
forms protect rights, the way a legitimate political system can derogate from the guarantee of certain rights during
emergencies. To the extent that they do, systemic questions may come to the fore based on these articles when a
legal system is unable to guarantee rights on a large scale and over an extended period of time, that is, only by impli-
cation. However, even then the guiding assumption largely remains unchanged: formal restructuration presupposes
substantive commitment with rights‐based norms. Consequently, in the final two articles, i.e., Articles 17 and 18,
the ECHR takes a step further. It concretises such an ‘implied’ understanding (i.e., consequently, the ECtHR always
reads Articles 17 and 18 in conjunction with the other Convention articles), and pays attention to the eventuality that
rights, or at least its discourse thereof, might be used to put in jeopardy the stability of a rights‐based legal system.
Thus, with Articles 17 and 18, the ECHR equips itself with standards with which the Convention organs can directly
tackle wrongs of sufficient intensity and systemic nature by looking at both their formal and substantive aspects. By
the help of these articles, ECHR develops standards that tell what a rights‐based legal system is not, in order to pro-
tect it, and consequently acknowledges the need for legal regulation of possible systemic threats to a rights‐based
system. In this section, I analyse Article 17 ECHR, and, in the next one, I analyse Article 18 ECHR.
The abuse of rights and freedoms not only has to be prevented, but has to be excluded from the legal scope and
remit of rights. That is the very sense and purpose of Article 17 ECHR. In collective terms, Article 17 ECHR provides
tools to save democracy from its being turned into a hollow shell lethal to democracy itself: Showing abuse of rights as
an anti‐juridical act plays a role in preventing anti‐constitutional majorities from realising their aim of dismantling con-
stitutional democracy itself.38 In individual terms, Article 17 ECHR prevents a legal subject quamoral agent from abus-
ing its freedom and agency. The enjoyments of the rights it abuses (to the extent that they are abused) is withdrawn
(even if only temporarily, as long as that is required to defend constitutional democracy).nett, The Apology Ritual: A Philosophical Theory of Punishment (Cambridge University Press, 2008); D. Markel ‘Retributive Jus-
the Demands of Democratic Citizenship’, (2012) 1 Virginia Journal of Criminal Law, 1; J. Tasioulas, ‘Punishment and Repen-
006) 81 Philosophy, 279.
t v. Germany, App. no. 17851/91 (ECtHR, 26 September 1995), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22appno%22:[%2217851/
%22itemid%22:[%22001‐57949%22]}, the ECtHR acknowledged the legitimacy of the concept of a ‘democracy capable of
g itself’ (§51, 59). In Ždanoka v. Latvia, App. no. 58278/00 (ECtHR, 16 March 2006), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%
%22:[%2258278/00%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001‐72794%22]}, the ECtHR interpreted Article 17 in this light (§§98–101).
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tackling such wrong use of rights, while ensuring that public power is wielded in accordance with legal norms and
procedures. The abuse of rights should not become in its turn an excuse for a flight from law on the side of author-
ities.39 This is why the structural purpose of Article 17 ECHR is to ensure that rights are exercised within the legal
context of a democratic constitutional system. This explains why Article 17 is only activated, and should only be acti-
vated, against groups or individuals whose freedom is intended to be liberticidal, which make use of the very Conven-
tion rights as one of the tools with which to erode the rule of law. Challenges that do not make use of rights, but of
other means (including, quite obviously, physical force) do not come within the remit of Article 17 ECHR. The legal
framework within which the state then has to react is a different one, akin to classical standards, among others such
as Article 2(2) (concerning lawful deprivation of their lives) or Article 15 (concerning an extended period of their
detention without trial when their members are apprehended) can be applied in such cases.4.1 | Syntax
Contrary to most other articles in the Convention, no right is enshrined in Article 17; instead, the said provision affirms
a key duty, which is both legal (do not abuse the rights protected by this Convention) and hermeneutical (do not mis-
interpret rights; do not include in the breadth and scope of the rights actions that are formally within its protective
range, but substantially result in the undermining of rights). Thus, Article 17 ECHR neither protects a specific capacity
of rights‐holders (i.e., expression, liberty) nor requires procedural standards in view of those (i.e., fair trial, no punish-
ment without law). As a result, one of the fundamental pillars of the architecture of European human rights law is not a
right, but a ‘duty’.404.2 | Invoked by
Unsurprisingly, Article 17 is typically invoked by states against litigants that are formally rights‐holders. The prohibi-
tion of the abuse of rights reverses the standard normative relation governed by the ECHR. Article 17 protects the
legal system of human rights as a whole as well as specific Convention rights from rights‐holders with a view to safe-
guard the democratic constitutional system. For example, in United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, the ECtHR
identified five broad criteria when the right to association may be abused through the creation and maintenance of
a political party: (1) The party is not a democratic party proper because 2) the party resorts to illegal or undemocratic
methods, 3) encourages the use of violence, 4) aims at undermining the democratic and pluralistic political system, 5)
pursues objectives that are racist or likely to destroy the rights and freedoms of others (§23; cf. German Communist
Party, at 4).39See, Glimerveen and Haagenback v. the Netherlands, App. no. 8438/78 (ECmHR, 11 October 1979), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng#{%22appno%22:[%228348/78%22]}, at 187.
40For Kelsen, ‘the right in the specific sense of the word is the legal power to enforce an existing duty’ General Theory of Norms (Oxford
University Press, 1991), at 324. This definition of right assumes an already existing normative justification to protect an action or an
object, and a legal power that enforces those standards aptly. Therefore, rights have a relational character. Consequently, there
already exists a possibility of governability of relations construed in legal terms. However, one's status as a subject of rights, within
the legal system, is itself premised on a basic duty. This duty imposes an obligation as enshrined in, for example, Article 17 ECHR.
Therefore, as a condition of possibility, human rights are premised on a duty that a subject of right owes both to oneself as a holder
of rights and to the legal system. To the extent that the human rights system remains premised on such a duty, and to the extent that
Article 17 ECHR and Article 30 of the Universal Declaration mention it, this moral duty understood in legal terms remains conceptually
nested with the idea of rights as entitlements, i.e., which set of rights I am entitled to depends on my conduct vis‐à‐vis the aforemen-
tioned duty.
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The tension between the affirmation of autonomy and the curbing of autonomy to safeguard it calls for a delicate
balancing act. This accounts for Article 17 having been constructed as aiming at preventing the ‘complete’ subversion
of human rights,41 not any action that may, even slightly, affect the wholeness of rights. As noted in Paksas v. Lithu-
ania, Article 17 activates only ‘on an exceptional basis and in extreme cases’ (§87).
4.4 | How it has to be constructed
The effectiveness of the prohibition of the abuse of rights depends, however, on the article being constructed in
an open‐ended fashion, in the particular sense of serving as a complement to the meaning of all other substantive
articles of the Convention. Article 17 is in itself a ‘negativity’ to be read in conjunction with each of the other sub-
stantive Convention articles. The purpose of Article 17 is to complement the full legal meaning of all other articles.
This is the case, for example, when the limitations of an article with which Article 17 is read in conjunction are
considered to be limiting, and there is nevertheless an acknowledgment that that right is being utilized for ends
‘contrary to the text and spirit of the Convention’ (Marais v. France, at 190). In such a way, Article 17 operates
as a fundamental check over the use of various fundamental rights. In particular, individuals and groups with
liberticidal aims are prevented ‘from exploiting in their own interests the principles enunciated in the Convention’
(Paksas v. Lithuania, §87). Wherein such an aim does not exist, the ECtHR does not apply Article 17. This can be
illustrated by the companion case Paksas v. Lithuania, regarding a former Lithuanian President who had been
impeached and disqualified from holding elected office for life after being condemned on several accounts for
cronyist behaviour. The ECtHR stated that Article 17 could not be invoked by the (new) Lithuanian authorities,
because the underlying conduct (of the former President), even if reproachable, did not aim at subverting the sys-
tem of rights (§89).
4.5 | Beyond balancing
There is no balancing in the case law on Article 17. Its ‘negative’ character entails that there are no limitations or
exceptions. It takes two not only to tango, but also to balance. The normative force of Article 17 is not employed
to determine in what manner the legal interference of rights is to take place, but rather to determine what has been
interfered with.42 Thus, in those cases where Article 17 is applied, the legal decision is, comparatively speaking, not
detailed.43 As such, the logics of freedom reach their conceptual and practical limits when they confront the essence
of unfreedom.44
4.6 | Implications: Not only formally valid, but also substantively valid
Article 17 ensures that the exercise of each right is not simply legally but also normatively valid. This connects each
article of the Convention enshrining a fundamental right with the normative order of a free society. Therefore, the
scope of difference that each fundamental right promotes and guarantees stays within a ‘uniform’ framework of plu-
rality—akin in effect but not in rationale to Rawls's idea of ‘reasonable pluralism’.41Since Article 17 is to be used in order to prevent a subversive use of the Convention rights, it cannot be utilised by state authorities
for those reasons which the Convention does not explicitly refer to; see United Communist Party v. Turkey, App. no. 19392/92 (ECtHR,
30 January 1998), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22fulltext%22:[%2219392/92%22]}, §60.
42D. Keane, ‘Attacking Hate Speech under Article 17 of the European Convention on Human Rights’, (2007) 25 Netherlands Quarterly
of Human Rights, 641, 643, 656.
43Whereas the case law of Articles 8–11 relies on the notions of balancing and discretion, when these articles are read in conjunction
with Article 17, the exercises relating to balancing and discretion reach their judicial limit.
44Therefore, for Cannie and Voorhoof, Article 17 generates a ‘guillotine effect’. See their, ‘The Abuse Clause and Freedom of Expres-
sion in the European Human Rights Convention’, (2011) 29 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 54, 58.
NASIR 315Further, those individuals and groups that combat a legal system by abusing their rights find their enjoyable
set of legally guaranteed rights reduced in view of their moral ‘rightness’. Importantly, however, it means that
the activation of Article 17 does not throw one against whom this article is invoked out of the legal context. That
is in the sense that all of its legal protections are withdrawn (Glimmerveen, at 195). In W.P. and Others v. Poland, for
example, the ECtHR dealt with a complaint against the Polish government for banning a racist and anti‐Semitic
association entitled ‘National and Patriotic Association of Polish Victims of Bolshevism and Zionism’. In it, the
ECtHR noted that to achieve Article 17's purpose, it was not ‘necessary to take away every one of the rights
and freedoms guaranteed from persons found to be engaged in activities aimed at the destruction of any of those
rights and freedoms’ (W.P. and Others, The Law). Thus, Article 17 only causes that subject (party, individual,
group) to lose those rights that protect its specific capacity, such as association, thought or expression. Only those
capacities that abuse rights are, so to speak, ‘neutralised’ (Lawless v. Ireland, 1, 13, 15).45 It also means that a holder
of rights does not lose non‐derogable rights.46
Importantly, Article 17 ensures that when a rights‐holders abuses its rights by interpreting them unreasonably,
it is human rights itself which requires circumscribing its capacity to act. This entails that the abuser remains
through and thoroughly a rights‐holder. Article 17 identifies the set of rights that one is entitled to depending
on one's conduct, without conditioning the very status as rights‐holder. The calibration of the scope of action is
undertaken by reference to statements, actions and manifestations, and participation in organised social prac-
tices47.48 For example, in the German Communist Party case, the former Commission noted that the party itself
spoke of ‘the dictatorship of the proletariat’ (at 3). Therefore, its establishment and organisation constituted an
activity within the meaning of Article 17 (at 4). This fact in itself made invocation of Articles 9, 10 and 11 redun-
dant. Resultantly, Article 17 ensures that rights are exercised by subjects in a manner that their exercise remains
generalisable within the context of human rights. Thus, Article 17 is important in the framework of the ECHR
because it ensures the continuity of a legal system that the ECHR establishes in the face of contingency and
behavioural unpredictability.4.7 | Pre‐emptive character
Furthermore, unlike others articles, Article 17 is pre‐emptive (Glimerveen, at 196). This means that Article 17 can
be used to withdraw the protective capacity of specific rights. This occurs at a time when the content of an act
is troublesome, albeit the subject is within an ostensible legal threshold (Glimerveen, at 190; German Communist
Party, at 4). In German Communist Party, for example, ‘the dictatorship of proletariat’ had not been established.45As far as the case law of Article 17 is concerned, it has been relied on only to withdraw those rights that ‘have been deflected from
their real purpose’ (Paksas v. Lithuania, App. no. 34932/04 (ECtHR, 6 January 2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22appno%22:
[%2234932/04%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001‐102617%22]}, §88): the right to freedom of thought and opinion (Kühnen v. Germany,
App. no. 12194/86 (ECmHR, 12 May 1988), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22fulltext%22:[%2212194/86%22]}), expression
(Schimanek v. Austria, App. no. 32307/96 (ECtHR, 1 February 2000), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22appno%22:[%2232307/
96%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001‐24075%22]}, Pavel Ivanov v. Russia, App. no. 35222/04 (ECtHR, 20 February 2007), http://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/eng#{%22appno%22:[%2235222/04%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001‐79619%22]}), or association (Hizb‐ut Tahrir v. Ger-
many, App. no. 31098/08 (ECtHR, 12 June 2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22appno%22:[%2231098/
08%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001‐111532%22]}).
46‘Only four rights in the Convention are absolute in the sense that their suspension or restriction can never be justified: the right not
to be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 3); the right not to be held in slavery or ser-
vitude (Article 4(1)); the right not to be convicted for conduct which was not an offence under national or international law at the time
it occurred (Article 7(1)) and the right not to have a heavier penalty imposed for an offence than the one applicable at the time the
offence was committed (Article 7(1))’ (S. Greer, above, n. 33, at 44–5).
47Cf. Kühnen, above, n. 45, The Facts; Schimanek, above, n. 45, The Facts.
48The first signs of such liberticidal aims can be discerned at the level of expression. Thus, in a large number of cases, Article 17 has
been activated to remove the protection of Article 10 on the right to freedom of expression. This is especially so when a remark is
explicitly ‘directed against the Convention's underlying values’ (Paksas, above, n. 45, §88).
316 NASIRAs such, Article 17 is theoretically central in another sense. It explicitly gives the positive legal system a strong
normative basis. Thus, an application of Article 17 goes beyond any abstraction that positive law does from the
kind of motivation in order to gauge legal conformity. As such, the case law of Article 17 is not simply limited
to being contented with protecting a law‐abiding behaviour. Consequently, Article 17 can be relied on before a
liberticidal individual or group increases its socio‐political influence enormously. In fact, one of the crucial tasks
that the drafters of the ECHR faced, and consequently the aim that Article 17 importantly tries to realize, was
to block the resurgence of liberticidal leaders and groups.49 In other words, a political consciousness of temporality
guides Article 17. If the threat, however, becomes alarming, a democratic constitutional state, and that alone, can
utilise Article 15 in order to derogate from the guarantee of certain rights, while declaring an emergency.4.8 | Distinction between abuse and misuse of rights
Article 17 is seldom found to be applicable after a threat has subsided or has been overcome (De Becker, Report of 8
January 1960, Series B No. 2, 137–138). Very telling in that regard is Lehideux and Isorni v. France. In that case, the
ECtHR rejected constructing the limits of freedom of the press through the perspective of Article 17, contrary to what
the French authorities had done when the leading French daily Le Monde had published an article defending a rather
revisionist account of Pétain's role in the Vichy regime. Characterising the publication as an abuse of rights failed to
consider the fundamental role of time and timing in the application of Article 17. The Court noted that ‘the lapse of
time makes it inappropriate to deal with such remarks, forty years on, with the same severity as ten or twenty years
previously’ (§55).4.9 | Edging behaviour back to the Convention
Article 17 has been interpreted by the ECtHR as favouring individuals or groups moving back into the sphere of
protection of the ECHR. The ruling in Kühnen, for example, may be constructed as an invitation to drop refer-
ences to a revolutionary overthrow of the State and the establishment of a dictatorship of proletariat from the
political agenda of a political party.50 This reconciles the prohibition of the abuse of rights to undermine the49The preparatory notes of Article 17 ECHR clearly pinpoint the aim of its drafters: developing standards that would legally regulate
abuses of rights and freedoms before it is too late. As a drafter of Article 17, Maxwell‐Fyfe remarked: ‘We do not desire by sentimen-
tality in drafting to give evilly disposed persons the opportunity to create a totalitarian government which will destroy Human Right
altogether’, http://www.echr.coe.int/LibraryDocs/Travaux/ECHRTravaux‐ART17‐CDH(75)7‐BIL1338904.pdf, at 3. In his concurring
opinion in Lehideux, Judge Jambrek influentially noted: ‘The European Convention was drafted as a response to the experience of
world‐wide, and especially European, totalitarian regimes prior to and during the Second World War. One of its tasks was, according
to Rolv Ryssdal, to “sound the alarm at their resurgence”’ (§3). Despite the validity of this observation, the source cited does not con-
tain any such quote from Ryssdal (see, R. Ryssdal, ‘The Expanding Role of the European Court of Human Rights’, in A. Eide and J.
Helgesen (eds.), The Future of Human Rights Protection in a Changing World (Norwegian University Press, 1991), 115). Be as it may,
in Refah Partisi v. Turkey, App. no. 41340/98 (ECtHR, 13 February 2002), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22appno%22:
[%2241340/98%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001‐60936%22]}, the ECtHR noted: ‘A State cannot be required to wait until a political
party has seized power and begun to take concrete steps to implement a policy incompatible with the standards of the Convention
and democracy, even though the danger of that policy for democracy is sufficiently established and imminent’ (§102).
50In certain cases, this may cause anti‐constitutional elements to be duplicitous and ambiguous. What is academically required at such
moments is to analyse the manner through which their apparently legal conduct is conceptualised. For a relevant case study, one can
look at the political repercussion of Jörg Haider's far‐right Austrian Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs), which was included
in the Austrian cabinet when it gained 26.9% of the votes in the general elections of 1999. Subsequently, there was an instalment of
diplomatic sanctions against Austria by the EU. However, the report of the panel appointed by the ECtHR monitoring Vienna's human
rights record was decisive in ending the sanctions. Similarly, a recent judgment by the German Constitutional Court that blocked the
ban on extreme right‐wing National Democratic Party (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands) is interesting because of its focus on
the issue of public opinion and general influence. The Court believed that on the both these counts, NPD did not stand any chance to
succeed. Things would have been otherwise, had NPD been influential. In other words, it also means that when human rights meet a
political limit, it becomes less of righteous government of men and more of government of righteous men.
NASIR 317Convention with the tolerance of arguments regarding the desirability of the very content of the Convention. It
is because of this tricky balancing act that Article 17 stands in an inverse relation with the social effectiveness
of human rights norms: the lesser the number of cases in which states ‘win’ on the basis of Article 17, the more
socially effective human rights norms are likely to be in the guidance of conduct in society.4.10 | Bridge to next section
The regulation of freedom necessarily includes the prohibition of certain courses of ‘free’ action on the basis of
a proper consideration of the full context of such actions. In this section, I have claimed that Article 17 plays a
fundamental role in that regard, by signalling to rights‐holders what they cannot do on the basis of the very
rights that constitute their agency in legal terms. Whereas limitations and exceptions to rights define the shape
of freedom, Article 17 defines the essence of (un)freedom. In the next section, I consider the other ‘dark’ side of
rights, the ‘statal’ equivalent of abuse of rights. National authorities may make use of rights and rights discourses
in ways that render the legal and political system (increasingly) antithetical to the effective enjoyment of rights.
Article 18 ECHR is intended to prevent this from happening by limiting the very limits that states can impose on
rights.5 | HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATE POWER: A PRIMORDIAL IF AGONISTIC
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purpose other than those for which they have been prescribed.
Article 18 ECHR: Limitation on use of restrictions on rightsSo far, I have shown how the full definition of rights depends on clauses that restrict the scope of freedom of
rights‐holders in order to uphold a rights‐based legal system. In the process, I have stressed the extent to which rights
depends on the executive and administrative capacities of states. Sections 2 and 3 made clear the extent to which
institutionalised collective action through the state makes possible the legally mediated realisation of freedom. In this
section, I will consider the ‘dark side’ of the centrality of the state in the protection of rights. If in abstract terms the
state is called to become the champion of rights, the force and power of the state may result in the undermining of
rights. This calls for law closing the full definition of rights by means of limiting the very limiting and excepting actions
of the state. This is the structural role played by one of the fundamental provisions of the Convention, Article 18
ECHR.51
Article 18 ECHR limits the discretion of public authorities when restricting the scope of Convention rights.52
As is also the case with Article 15 ECHR (empowering public authorities to calibrate the remit of rights during
emergencies), Article 18 ECHR stands out on account of it explicitly addressing not rights‐holders but publicly read textbook, for example, wonders: ‘It is not clear why Article 18 was included in the Convention. There is no equivalent
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights … There is not much guidance in the preparatory work. Article 18 may seem to
to the Convention except to make explicit what is either implicit in other provisions or may be thought to be well established
e general principles recognised by international law’ B. Rainey, E. Wicks and C. Ovey, Jacobs, White, and Ovey: The European
on on Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2014), at 124.
Greek case, App no. 3321‐3/67, 3344/67 (ECmHR, 24 January 1968), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22fulltext%22:
1/67%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001‐3049%22]}, Article 17 was invoked by the applicant states against the use of Article
e Greek colonel junta. However, the ECmHR decided against the derogation, and did not consider Article 17 as being useful
e the case. Albeit in this case the Commission did not read Article 15 in conjunction with Article 17, it did not rule out a pos-
r such an analysis.
318 NASIRauthorities.53 As far as the latter is concerned, the result is the limitation of the restricting powers of public
authorities. While the argumentative burden rests with the eventual individual plaintiff, Article 18 ECHR makes
clear that the setting of limits and exceptions to rights in the Convention does not imply extending a blank cheque
to Convention states. Freedom can and must be restricted in order to ensure the wholeness of the system of
rights. The limitations and exceptions foreseen in the ECHR constitute the clear set of rationales for that purpose.
Limitations and exceptions actually undertaken for other reasons constitute actual breaches of Convention
rights.54 In plain English, there may well be instances in which actions that public authorities claimed constituted
legitimate limitations to rights should not be regarded as such, but as violations of rights.555.1 | The text in its context
Article 18 ECHR results from the tension between the general and abstract characterisation of public authorities as
the guarantor of Convention rights and the concrete and, so to say, contextual possibility that specific public author-
ities may either breach Convention rights or, hopefully only exceptionally, may be willing to become their nemesis. It is
indeed the concrete and historical ‘state’ that is occasionally condemned on the basis of Article 18 ECHR. Indeed, the
ECtHR, even if declaring the responsibility of the state, focuses on the specific actors within the machinery of the
state responsible for the breaches.56
This gap requires keeping under constant scrutiny the substance and quality of state action. Review of state
action demands going beyond the procedural forms and the arguments that may be invoked by the state, or what53Thus, the implementation of rights remains sensitive to the factual and situational circumstances, while rights bring the form of the
legal guarantor in line with their normative content. Importantly, this fact limits the application of the conceptual lens of human ‘dig-
nity’ (or related concepts that one would rather understand in essentialist terms) to analyse the case law of ECHR systematically
because Articles 15 and 18 talk about discretion and obligations of a legal entity that is not a human and which, as a complex of insti-
tutional structures, does not possess itself any human ‘dignity’ as such. Crucially, Roman law spoke of the dignitas hominis of the
Roman state, office‐holders, patricians and the like, and punished Romans accordingly. Thus, as many commentators have pinpointed,
the idea of human dignity is conceptually and analytically different from that of the Roman idea of dignitas hominis because the latter
remained connected: (a) with the honour of certain statuses, (b) with what law should give to those legal subjects depending on what
they deserve, and (c) was additionally applicable to inanimate entities that were neither natural persons nor reducible to them, i.e., the
state. Be that as it may, Article 15 ECHR limits the enforcement of certain fundamental human rights by permitting public authorities
to justifiably derogate from their guarantee, and resultantly divides the concept of human ‘dignity’ into two halves, i.e., in an expansive
sense and in its core sense, which corresponds to derogable and non‐derogable rights. However, even non‐derogable rights do not
apply to everyone in plain, categorical terms (see, sections 4.1, 4.4, 4.6). Moreover, Article 18 ECHR works through double negation.
If ‘dignity’ affirmatively grounds rights and freedoms, then limitation and exception clauses contextualise rights and freedoms, and
consequently define what we are not to understand by ‘dignity’ only in abstract terms. Then, Article 18 ECHR limits the discretion
of a legal guarantor of rights with respect to the legitimate breadth of limitation clauses, while moving a step away from the concept
of ‘dignity’, because the application of Article 18 understands the violation of rights with respect to its proper limitations and the use of
Article 18 entails that a limiting act did not fall in line with the limitation clauses and only this, as a consequence, leads to the violation
of Article 18. Now, if one instead analyses limitations and exceptions to rights on the basis of ‘dignity’, the possibility of deriving the
basis of all rights and freedoms affirmatively from the very same concept appears tautological, or, in other words, the same concept
cannot ground both what things are, what their limits are, what limits are imposed on them, and what they are not, without losing its
analytical clarity. Or, one can instead argue that ‘dignity’ rather signifies loosely, and broadly, what lawyers call, following Aristotle (Pol-
itics, 1213a), a ‘legal intuition’ (Radbruch's ‘Rechtsgefühl’). However, without grounding legal intuitions contextually within governmen-
tal practices, institutional structures and legal norms that articulate those intuitions, one's analysis of the ECHR case law using such a
concept would remain anything but coherent, or, what amounts to saying the same thing, analytical coherence forces intuitively
obtained concepts to shed their essentialist form and to merge with the context from which they appear to emerge in the first place.
54See Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, App. no. 5829/04 (ECtHR, 31 May 2011), http:// http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22appno%22:
[%225829/04%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001‐104983%22]}, §260; and, Gusinskiy v. Russia, App. no. 70276/01 (ECtHR, 19 May
2004), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22appno%22:[%2270276/01%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001‐61767%22]}, §77.
55Gusinskiy, above, n. 54, §§73, 75.
56While mentioning in Gusinskiy (above, n. 54) the role of prison authorities, Acting Minister for Press and Mass Communications, and
a State investigating officer in intimidating the applicant (§76), court decisions involving Article 18 do not find the state per se to be in
the wrong. Only specific individuals working in the state machinery—not the general signifier of the State—are seen as a causal factor,
even if this may resultantly give the state, from a legal perspective, a ‘transcendent’ status.
NASIR 319is the same, consider the substantive implications of the actual actions of the state, so to say, underneath the legal
form in which they are clothed. Article 18 ECHR sets the framework under which it is possible to check whether gov-
ernmental practices serve their declared purpose and unfold according to proper procedures. In Gusinskiy v. Russia, for
example, a violation of Article 18 was found to have occurred, when a Russian media tycoon who owned a private
media company, i.e., Media Most, was arrested and detained on charges of fraud. The applicant was released on
the basis of ‘agreement’ with Russian authorities while he was placed in detention by the same authorities: that
charges against him would be dropped if he sold Media Most to Gazprom, a giant conglomerate controlled by
the Russian state, at a price determined by Gazprom. The ECtHR noted that ‘it was not the purpose of such public‐
law matters as criminal proceedings and detention on remand to be used as part of commercial bargaining
strategies’.57 To put it differently, the explicit enshrinement of Article 18 ECHR was intended to reduce the chances
that the legal apparatus be used as a tool to breach Convention rights.58
Thus, it is based on an absence of following established practices (such as: investigation methods, detention pro-
cedures, use of the concept of ‘reasonable suspicion’, legal safeguards) through which the interferences with rights are
permitted under the ECHR that Article 18 is activated (Cebotari v. Moldova, §48). Thus, it is based on the manner in
which those measures are modified that a State may legally limit rights under law and accrue legitimacy onto itself
in the process. By looking at those practices, Article 18 ensures that the political relationship that human rights require
between its own normative standards and a concrete legal‐political guarantor is aptly maintained. The aptness that
Article 18 maintains stands in between the exception and the limitation clauses (the legal room the ECHR provides
to a state by acknowledging necessities relating to its monopoly of legitimate violence) and the right to derogation
(the legal room the ECHR provides to a State by acknowledging necessities relating to an emergency).
As much as is the case with Article 17 ECHR, as pointed out above, Article 18 ECHR does not have a substance of
its own, but has to be applied and implemented jointly with other sections of the Convention.59 In particular, Article
18 ECHR review brings into play the unwritten ‘spirit of the Convention’.60 Such an unwritten spirit cannot be artic-
ulated in an exhaustive manner, but still remains a fundamental resource by reference to which the ECtHR
characterises state actions and decisions as incompatible with the Convention.5.2 | Referring facts back to norms
The structural effect of Article 18 ECHR is that of completing the set of legal resources that the ECtHR can mobilise
when confronted with state breaches of rights justified in the name of upholding the very same rights. While quite
obviously there is a political dimension to such a state of affairs, Article 18 ECHR allows the issue to remain a fully
legal one, or, what is the same, provides an explicit basis on which such infringements can be tackled within strictly
legal discourse. In other words, Article 18 draws a legal, and not merely political or moral, line between compliance
with rights and manipulation of rights with a view to infringe them.61
It is important to add that while Article 18 adds a fundamental layer of protection against the subversion of rights
‘from within’, that is, protects rights from public authorities breaching them under the false cover of protecting them,
the Convention system of rights cannot but assume that in most cases public authorities are a champion, not the57§76.
58Cf. Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, App. no. 15172/13 (ECtHR, 22 May 2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22appno%22:
[%2215172/13%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001‐144124%22]}, §137; Sisojeva v. Latvia, App. no. 60654/00 (ECtHR, 15 January 2001),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22appno%22:[%2260654/00%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001‐79022%22]}, §129).
59Thus, in certain cases, Article 18 can be violated even when the article in conjunction with which it is read is not (cf. Gusinskiy, above,
n. 54, §73; Cebotari v. Moldova, App. no. 35615/06 (ECtHR, 13 November 2007), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22appno%22:
[%2235615/06%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001‐83247%22]}, §49).
60Lutsenko v. Ukraine, App. no. 6492/11 (ECtHR, 19 November 2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22appno%22:[%226492/
11%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001‐112013%22]}, §108.
61Ibid., §§104–110; Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, App. no. 49872/11 (ECtHR, 30 April 2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22appno%
22:[%2249872/11%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001‐119382%22]}, §299.
320 NASIRnemesis, of rights. In other words, Article 18 cannot be an effective means of creating or recreating a constitutional
culture of rights protection. If Article 18 protects such a culture, it only does to an extent by presupposing its impor-
tance and preventing actions that would rather end it.
5.3 | Avoiding the distortion of rights in the name of protecting them
In sum, Article 18 ensures that the legal apparatus on whose effectiveness and ‘good faith’ the Convention depends
(Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, §255; Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, §294) does not justify the distortion of rights in the name of
their protection (Gusinskiy v. Russia, §76). The obligation Article 18 imposes is that a legal guarantor of rights should
respect the authoritative room that human rights norms gives it. Therefore, when the ECtHR notes in Gusinskiy
(§§73–76) that the applicant's liberty was restricted for a purpose other than that provided for in Article 5(1c), the
ECtHR delimits the margin of discretion accorded to authorities. This means that limitation and exception clauses
not only address rights‐holders, but also a state. By doing so, Article 18 constrains, within the limitability of the afore-
mentioned clauses, the legal systems on which human rights depend. In other words, Article 18 points to an important
fact: if there are modalities of power (e.g., political, legal, administrative) that are to be utilized in order to establish an
order of freedom (i.e., democratic constitutional system), then that system has to remain cognizant of the workings of
power on which it relies. This is because the latter are never risk‐free. The negative conditions that define such sys-
tem, emerge from within it, and the way they are dealt with constitute the negative governmentality of human rights.
It is to the final recapitulation of this concept that the next section turns.6 | CONCLUDING REMARKS
I analysed how freedoms are interpreted in the background of a praxis. I argued that practices of autonomy already
presuppose limitations and exceptions to rights (Section 2). This entails that rights are defined not only by affirmative
statements but also, and crucially, by the limitations and exceptions to the very same rights. I then analysed why and in
which sense an autonomous moral agent is not free to do away with freedom (Section 3). Rights provide their holders
with the resources to contest legal and political decisions. However, rights cannot be constructed as enabling rights‐
holders to contest the very existence of the rights on which they stand. This led us to consider the extent to which
rights empower public authorities by identifying what the state cannot do by reference to the principles underpinning
rights (Section 4). Finally, I claimed that all these dynamics are theoretically interconnected. Negative governmentality
is placed at the crossroads where all of them meet, to the extent that what is of essence is what cannot be done
through freedom. The negative side of rights is indeed what makes a system out of the congeries of legal norms,
and what defines the law as a guide of conduct. Defining rights as privileges, as is implicit in many contemporary legal
and constitutional theories (including mainstream theories of EU law) is simply (and utterly) wrong. It is impossible to
be a rights‐holder without bearing certain duties and, more deeply, without implicitly assuming, in a certain Razian
manner, the ethics of autonomy.
The reconstruction of the law of the European Convention on Human Rights illustrates the theoretical points
made in this article. On the basis of a detailed analysis of the ‘negative’ clauses of the ECHR, I showed that these often
neglected norms turn the ECHR into a genuine legal system. The sections here studied not only form an integral part
of the Convention, but more importantly, function as certain limit‐concepts that play a decisive role in determining the
actual substantive content of rights in critical situations, in the very cases in which the role of rights is tested to its
limits. It is at these critical junctures that the fate of the human rights system is ultimately determined.
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